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FEDERALISM, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND
EQUAL PROTECTION
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
It is now my pleasure to introduce another constitutional
authority whose opinions are held in high regard and who is certainly a first-class scholar, Professor Leon Friedman of Hofstra
University. He is a lecturer at the Federal Judicial Center on
Civil Rights, co-editor of the volume "Justices of the United
States Supreme Court," 1 and he is going to speak to us about a
whole series of cases that do not fit easy categorization.
ProfessorLeon Friedman:
I did not think I would be hearing so many praises of Justice
O'Connor, but I am going to be doing the same thing in another
moment. This afternoon, I am going to talk about an important
federalism case 2 and some Commerce Clause cases, 4 all of
which bear directly on the way in which state and local governments operate.
I would like to start out with a few batting averages, in terms
of what the Supreme Court did last year. The Court found, particularly in the area of federalism, one federal law unconstitu6
tional. 5 As I add up my running total, from Marbwry v. Madison

1. LEON FRIEDMAN & FRED L. ISREAL, THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1969).
2. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides: "The

Congress shall have the power... [tio regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes." Id.
4. Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 112 S. Ct. 2365 (1992);
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct.
2009 (1992); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992); Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992).
5. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2428-29.
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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7
to today, the Court has found 129 federal laws unconstitutional.
Prior to the 1991-92 Term, the Court would often invoke the

First Amendment 8 or the Fifth Amendment 9 in order to find laws
unconstitutional. 10 It has been some time since the Court has
found a federal law unconstitutional on Tenth Amendment 11
grounds. 12 However, that is indeed what the Court did during
this Term. 13

In addition, the Supreme Court found fifteen state laws unconstitutional. 14 Five state laws were found unconstitutional on
7. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S.

Doe. No. 101-36, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 239-42 (Supp. 1990).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
Id.
10. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (federal restriction on political committee
expenditures implicated Free Speech and Freedom of Association Clauses);
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (gender classification enumerated in
Social Security Act violated Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
12. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
13. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
14. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992),
Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992);
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First Amendment grounds 15 and three state laws were struck
down on preemption grounds.1 6 The Court also found one state
law unconstitutional on Fourteenth Amendment 1 7 groundsl 8 and
one state law unconstitutional on Fifth Amendment grounds. 19
Finally, in the cases I will discuss this afternoon, the Supreme
Court held that five state laws violated the Commerce Clause. 20

According to my scoreboard, from 1789 to 1992, the United
States Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional 2,112 local

laws. 2 1 In other words, there is a sixteen-to-one ratio between the
Supreme Court striking down federal laws as compared to state
laws. This reminds me of Oliver Wendell Holmes' statement regarding Marbury v. Madison and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 22
He said: "I do not think the United States would come to an end
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,
112 S.Ct. 2395 (1992); Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n,
112 S.Ct. 2374 (1992); Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 112 S.
Ct. 2365 (1992); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031
(1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S.Ct. 2019 (1992); ; Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt,
112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992);
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S.Ct. 789 (1992); Norman v. Reed, 112 S.Ct.
698 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
15. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2709; R.A. V., 112 S.Ct. at 2538; Forsyth, 112 S.
Ct. at 2395; Norman, 112 S.Ct. at 698; Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 501.
16. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2608; Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2374; Morales,
112 S. Ct. at 2031.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. )IV, § 1, cl. 2. The Due Process Clause states:
"No State shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.... ." Id.
18. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at2791.
19. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
20. Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 112 S.Ct. 2365 (1992);
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct.
2009 (1992); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992); Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 112 S.Ct. 789 (1992).
21. S.Doc. No. 101-36, supra note 7, at 243-59.
22. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
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if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do
think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several States."23 This relates
precisely to questions of uniformity of federal and state laws
throughout the country.
I. FEDERALISM
Now let me turn to some specific cases because there were a
couple of eyebrow-raisers during this Term. I think the most interesting case in the area of federalism, notably, state governmental control, is New York v. United States.24 This case dealt with
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985.25
At issue was the disposal of low-level radioactive material such
as "luminous watch dials, smoke alarms, measurement devices,
medical fluids, research materials, and the protective gear and
construction materials used by workers at nuclear power
plants." 26 The federal government gave the states many opportunities to deal with the disposal of this material, but the states
were not interested in dealing with it.27 This was a classic case of
"not in my backyard."28 For instance, only three states operated
low-level radioactive waste disposal sites: Nevada, Washington,
and South Carolina. 29 Thereafter, Nevada and Washington closed
23. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law
School Ass'n of N.Y. (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96
(1920).
24. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
26. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2414.
27. Id. at 2414-15. Although there were available sites between 1969 and
1970 for the disposal of low-level waste, in the mid-1970s, many facilities
suffered from "unstable waste forms and packaging, and faulty facility siting,
design, and operations." Dan M. Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress
"Nuke" State Sovereignty in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 437, 441 (1987).
28. Michael E. Bums, Living the Past, Facing the Future, in LoW-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND FEAR 279, 293

(Michael E. Bums ed., 1988). "No one wants to live next door to a LLRW
[low-level radioactive waste] disposal facility." Id.
29. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2414.
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down their sites. 3 0 In response to an anticipated influx of radioactive waste, South Carolina decreased the amount of radioactive
waste it would accept by one-half.3 1
In December, 1979, The National Governors' Association
(NGA) formed a task force to create a state solution to this
problem. 32 In short, the NGA recommended that regional state
compacts should be formed whereby one state among the compact would house the repository. 3 3 Relying on the NGA's
recommendations, Congress, in 1980, passed the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 34 which authorized states to form
regional compacts. 3 5 However, when only three of these
compacts had been formed, Congress enacted the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.36 This Act
states in pertinent part: "If a State ... in which low-level

radioactive waste is generated is unable to provide for the
disposal of all such waste.., each State in which such waste is
generated,... shall take title to the waste.. .

.

37

In my view,

this amendment seems perfectly sensible; states may dispose of
radioactive waste by enacting their own laws or by forming
regional compacts, or states will be forced to take title to the
waste. 38
Seven years after this Act's enactment, forty-two states formed
regional compacts. 39 Even New York was perfectly willing to
comply with this Act until it met with local political pressure. 40
New York originally designated two counties upstate as appro30. Id. at 2415.
31. Id.
32. Berkovitz, supra note 27, at 443.
33. Id. at 444.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1982) (amended 1985).
35. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2415.
36. Id. The three compacts were formed with the South Carolina, Nevada,
and Washington sites. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(C) (1988).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988).
39. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2416.
40. Id. at 2416-17.
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priate sites for low-level radioactive waste, 4 1 but residents of
these counties opposed the state's selections. 42 Another case of
"not in my backyard." At this point, confronted with the problem
of having no radioactive disposal site, New York brought this
lawsuit. 43
The United States Supreme Court held that the "take title"
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 infringed on the sovereign rights of the states,
making it unconstitutional. 4 4 Justice O'Connor wrote, in my
view, an extremely sophisticated opinion in which she discussed
45
the complicated problems regarding federal and state relations.
Historically, the states had an enormous scope of operation and
the federal government was simply supposed to pick up the pieces
when the states could not do it themselves. 46 However, we no
longer practice that system. 47 In the case at hand, petitioners
agreed that Congress could have directly regulated waste disposal. 48 Rather, "Congress... impermissibly directed the States
to regulate in this field." 49 As such, the states' choices, namely,
the "take title" provision or another federal instruction, amounted
to
"two
unconstitutionally
coercive
regulatory
tech"50
niques ...
Justice O'Connor discussed two ways in which Congress could
influence a state's policy choice. 5 1 Primarily, the federal government can persuade states to adopt federal policy by imposing
41. Id. The five proposed sites were to be located in Allegany and
Cortland Counties. Id.
42. Id. at 2417.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2428.
45. Id. at 2417-24.
46. See id. at 2421. "Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress
lacked the authority in most respects to govern the people directly." ld.
47. Id. at 2423. "In providing for a stronger central government,
therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States." Id.
48. Id. at 2419-20.
49. Id. at 2420.

50. Id. at 2428.
51. Id. at 2423-24.
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conditions on the federal funding received by states. 52 This has
been done in welfare, 53 Medicare 5 4 and Medicaid, 55 wherein the
state machinery acts, using federal funds, to further the federal
government's interests. In my view, states are perfectly happy to
adhere to the conditions because the funding is provided by the

federal government. Indeed, if the states failed to comply with
this scheme, the federal government would tax them directly and
56
then impose its own system by preempting state law.

The second way in which the federal government can regulate

matters within the state is to bypass the state machinery altogether. 57 Either states must adhere to federal policy or the state

law will be preempted by federal regulation. 5 8 For instance,
various state statutes disallowed double trucks more than fiftyfive feet in length. 59 Thereafter, Congress imposed a law pro52. Id. at 2423. See also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)
(upholding Congress' requirement that South Dakota raise drinking age to
twenty-one in order to receive federal highway funds).
53. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (The Aid to Families
With Dependent Children Program [AFDC] is a voluntary program, subject to
federal conditions, and "is financed largely by the Federal Government,
..and is administered by the States.").
54. See United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 202 (Medicare is a
"federally subsidized, voluntary health insurance system for persons 65 or
older or who are disabled .... ").
55. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990)
("[P]articipating States must comply with certain requirements imposed by the
[Medicaid Act]... and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services..
").
56. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) ("The Congress is
expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the general welfare.").
57. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2424. See also infra
notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
58. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2424. See also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AimRCAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 6-27, at 497 (2d ed. 1988).
"For if Congress has validly decided to 'occupy the field' for the federal
government, state regulations will be invalidated no matter how well they
comport with substantive federal policies." Id.
59. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)
(holding state truck length restrictions violative of Commerce Clause);
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (statute
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hibiting truck length limitations. 60 Of course, under the expan-

sive view of the Commerce and Spending 61 Clauses, practically
everything that Congress does in this area is going to be upheld.

62

Justice O'Connor stated that if the federal government preempts
state law, federal officials will suffer the consequences if their

decision results in an unpopular sentiment. 63 However, where
state officials act upon federal direction, "it may be state officials
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.-"64 This
65
type of direction adversely affects legislative accountability.

"[D]ue to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate
in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not
preempted by federal regulations." 66 Indeed, this is an interesting
way of looking at federal/state relations.

II. COMMERCE CLAUSE
Let me now turn to the Commerce Clause cases. Two of these
cases respectively concerned statutes which dealt with the state
taxation of foreign activities 67 and interstate activities. 68 In Kraft
restricting use of 65 foot double trucks held to be violation of Commerce
Clause).
60. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2311(b) (1988). This section provides in pertinent
part: "No State shall establish, maintain, or enforce any regulation of
commerce which imposes an overall length limitation on commercial motor
vehicles .... ." Id.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 . The Spending Clause states: "The
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes ....
to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States .... ." Id.
62. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936) (congressional
action in regard to Spending Clause is presumptively constitutional).
63. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 112 S. Ct. 2365
(1992).
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General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue, 69 the Iowa

Business Tax on Corporations 70 imposed a tax on dividends from
a corporation's foreign subsidiaries, but dividends received from
domestic subsidiaries were not taxed. 7 1 In a very straightforward

opinion, the Supreme Court declared this statute unconstitutional. 72 The Court held that on its face, the statute discriminated

against foreign commerce 73 in violation of the Foreign Com-

74
merce Clause.
The second Commerce Clause case, Quill Corporationv. North
76
Dakota,75 received a lot of attention from the legal community.

The Court was presented with a question regarding whether an
out-of-state mail order company can be subjected to a use tax, 77

on behalf of its customers inside the state, when the company solicits orders in a state, but has no sales representative, no salesman of any kind, and no office in the state. 78 Previously, in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,7 9 the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause is violated when a

state taxes an out-of-state mail-order company whose only contact

68. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
69. Kraft, 112 S. Ct. at 2365.
70. IOWA CODE § 422.32 (1990).
71. Kraft, 112 S. Ct. at 2367.
72. Id. at 2372.
73. Id.
74. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The Foreign Commerce Clause
provides: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations.

. .

."

Id.

75. 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
76. See The Supreme Court, 1991 Term; Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 163, 163-73 (1992); Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the
Constitution:A Comment on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 68 NOTR,EDAME L. REv. 11, 16 (1992).

77. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1908. In North Dakota, a use tax is imposed
"upon property purchased for storage, use or consumption within the State."
Id.
78. Id. at 1907.
79. 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overrdedby Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1910-11.
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with the state is to solicit and fulfill mail orders. 80 The Supreme
Court upheld the Bellas Hess rule in regard to the Commerce
Clause and found the North Dakota statutory scheme unconstitu-

tional. 8 1 In so doing, the Court underscored Congress' constitutional ability to legislatively overrule this decision 82 since it is
83
well within Congress' powers to regulate interstate commerce.
Of the two non-tax cases this Term, 84 Wyoming v. Oklahoma,85 a case heard under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, 86 was one of the more interesting cases. Wyoming filed
a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court against the State of
Oklahoma because Oklahoma passed a law requiring utility plants
within the state to use at least ten percent of its coal from mines
in Oklahoma. 87 This was a "buy local law" aimed at private util88
ity companies in Oklahoma.

89
This case is factually dissimilar to Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,

which focused on the constitutionality of a South Dakota policy
which directed cement produced at a state owned cement plant to
be sold to South Dakota residents prior to other contract com80. Id. at 758, 760. The Court also held that, consistent with the Due
Process Clause, physical presence must be demonstrated in order for a state to
impose a use tax on a mail order company. Id. at 758-59. However, in Quill,
the Court overruled the physical presence requirement and instead held that the
inquiry focuses upon whether "a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself
of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State . . " Quill, 112
S. Ct. at 1910-11.
81. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1916.
82. Id.
83. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
84. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789
(1992).
85. 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992).
86. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 provides in pertinent part: "In all
Cases.. . in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction." Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1988). Section 1251
provides: "The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of
all controversies between two or more States." Id.
87. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 792-93.
88. OKLA. STAT. tit. 45, § 939 (Supp. 1993).
89. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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mitments. 90 Essentially, the Court upheld the policy since the
state was a market participant, instead of a market generator, 9 1
the latter directly implicating the Commerce Clause.9 2 Rather, in
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the state was acting as a regulator, requiring utility plants to buy ten percent of their coal locally be93
fore they sought coal from other states.
The Supreme Court held that Wyoming had standing to bring
this suit. 94 The State of Wyoming faced a loss in severance taxes
since private Wyoming coal companies would not be able to sell
their coal in Oklahoma as a result of the stated legislation. 95
Thus, Wyoming suffered direct injury, namely, a decrease in tax
revenues. 96 Furthermore, the Court struck down the Oklahoma
legislation as violative of the Commerce Clause. 97 Inasmuch as
the Act discriminated against interstate commerce, Oklahoma
failed to justify its protectionist actions. 98
There are two other Commerce Clause cases that require some
attention and both of them are waste cases, Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt99 and Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources. 100 These
cases directly relate to City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 0°1
where the Supreme Court held that garbage was an item of commerce when it moved across state lines since it can be bought or
90. Id. at 432-33.
91. Id. at 440. The Commerce Clause is not implicated when a state acts as
a purchaser (market participant). Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794, 810 (1976). A market participant neither prohibits nor regulates the flow
of commerce. Id. at 806.
92. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437.
93. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 793.
94. Id. at 796. To have standing, a litigant must allege specific and
concrete injury to himself and show that the exercise of judicial review will
remedy his injury. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
95. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 796.
96. Id. at 797.
97. Id. at 800.
98. Id. at 801.
99. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
100. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
101. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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sold. 102 In both Chemical Waste Management and Fort Gratiot

there were long quotes from City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,
whereby the Supreme Court stated that it does not believe in arti-

ficial barriers between states, and that there should not be political barriers to the free movement of commerce. 103 Clearly, this

reasoning directly implicates the original intent behind the Commerce Clause. 104
In Chemical Waste Management, Alabama passed legislation

which imposed a fee in the amount of $25.60 per ton for the disposal of hazardous waste and an additional fee for the disposal of
hazardous waste generated outside Alabama. 10 5 The State con-

tended that its actions were justified by legitimate safety and
health concerns. 106 However, the Court held that this statutory
scheme violated the Commerce Clause because less discrimina-

tory methods would have efficiently decreased the amount of
waste. 10 7 "To the extent Alabama's concern touches environ-

mental conservation and the health and safety of its citizens, such
concern does not vary with the point of origin of the
waste .... "108

Fort Gratiot was not a state barrier to waste case, but instead
involved a county barrier to waste. 109 Specifically, the Michigan
102. See id. at 622. "All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause
protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset." Id.
103. Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2013 (quoting City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626-27); Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at
2024 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626-27).
104. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)
(The Constitution "was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division.").
105. Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2012. The Alabama
statute provided: "For waste and substances which are generated outside of
Alabama and disposed of at a commercial site for the disposal of hazardous
waste or hazardous substances in Alabama, an additional fee shall be levied at
the rate of $72.00 per ton." ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(b) (Supp. 1992).
106. Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2014.
107. Id. at 2015-16.
108. Id.
109. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2022 (1992).
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statutory scheme restricted any person from "accept[ing] for disposal solid waste... that is not generated in the county in which
the disposal area is located" without authorization. 110 Respondents, Michigan and St. Clair County, contended that the statute
was valid inasmuch as it treated out-of-state waste and waste
generated in other Michigan counties in the same manner.II 1 In
support of the Court's disagreement with respondents' argument,
the majority cited Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison. 112 In Dean
Milk, the Supreme Court struck down, as violative of the Commerce Clause, an ordinance which prevented the sale of milk unless the milk was pasteurized at a plant within five miles from the
City of Madison. 113 The fact that Wisconsin plants which were
geographically beyond the proscribed five mile radius were similarly situated to out-of-state plants proved to be irrelevant. 114
The Supreme Court held that the Michigan statute violated the
Commerce Clause inasmuch as respondents failed to justify its
actions on any health or safety basis. 115 The Court found that respondents incorrectly relied on Sporhose v. Nebraska.116 In
Sporhase, the State of Nebraska tried to preserve precious
groundwater through legislation which prevented the exportation
of ground water without a permit.117 The statute placed four
conditions on the obtainment of a permit: a request which is reasonable, not harmful to the public welfare, not against conservation, and the state which is receiving water from Nebraska must
"grant[] reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground water
from that state for use in the State of Nebraska."118 The Supreme
Court held that the reciprocity requirements were unconstitu110. Id. See also MCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.413a (West 1992).
111. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024.
112. Id. at 2025 (discussing Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349
(1951)).
113. Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 356.
114. Id. at354 n.4.
115. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027.
116. Id. at 2026 (discussing Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)).
117. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944.
118. Id. (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978)).
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tional. 119 Writing generally about a state's ability to preserve its
own ground water, the Supreme Court seemed to be very sympathetic to a state's desire to save its resources, particularly those
that are vital for its own citizens. 120 It was for that very reason,
furtherance of the health and safety of its citizens, that the Court
upheld the first three conditions. 12 1 But in Fort Gratiot, the
county could not offer any health or safety justification for its
waste discrimination. 122 Therefore, the statute was struck
down. 123
III. TITLE IX
Now I am going to make a huge leap from state and federal
Commerce Clause cases, to cases dealing with obligations of state
or local governments to protect their citizenry from injuries. In
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 124 a teacher sexually abused and harassed a female student.125 Plaintiff, seeking
money damages, invoked Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972.126 Title IX states in pertinent part: "No person
• . .shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,

be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . ..."127 The federal government can enforce Title IX

by threatening to withhold funds. 128 Title IX was passed because
Title VI, 129 while covering race and national origin, did not

119. Id. at 957-58.
120. Id. at 956.

121. Id. at 955.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027.
Id. at 2028.
112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
Id. at 1031.
Id.

127. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1682(1) (1988).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988).
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cover gender. 130 Congress, rather than amending Title VI,
passed Title IX.
In Franklin, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Title IX,

which affords litigants an implied right of action, provides a
damages remedy when appropriate. 13 1 The majority opinion, delivered by Justice White, stated that although the text and history
of a statute should be examined in determining whether Congress

intended to create a right of action, the general rule is that courts
have the power to award any appropriate remedy unless Congress
has expressly indicated otherwise. 132
Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment, 133 had been

trying to cut back on Cort v. Ash, 134 which provided four factors
that courts may look at when determining whether a private remedy is implied in a statute not expressly providing one. 135 In his
concurring opinion in Franklin, Justice Scalia disagreed with the
majority's broad remedial policy since Title IX provides an im130. Id. Title VI provides in pertinent part: "No person... shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance." Id.
131. Franklin, 112 S.Ct. at 1038.
132. Id. at 1032. See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-49 (1979)
(damages remedy available in due process claim since Congress took no
explicit action to bar such judicial relief); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684
(1946) (federal courts have broad remedial powers "where legal rights have
been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion....").
133. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038-39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
135. Id. at 78.
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose special benefit the
statute was enacted," - that is, does the statute create a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally,
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. (citations omitted).
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plied right of action. 136 "[W]hen rights of action are judicially
'implied,' categorical limitations upon their remedial scope may
be judicially implied as well." 137 However, Justice Scalia examined the legislative history and found that since 1979, when the
Supreme Court declared that there was an implied right of action
under Title IX, 138 Congress had not enacted any legislation
which limited the remedies available in a suit brought under Title
IX. 139 Such a failure was proof that Congress intended a broad
remedial scheme under Title X. 140 In essence, the Supreme
Court held that a private damages remedy was available under
Title IX in suits against school boards. 141
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
Finally, I will discuss two other school district cases dealing
with Equal Protection1 42 violations. The Supreme Court heard
two desegregation cases, one dealing with Mississippi's higher
education system1 43 and the other dealing with a local public
school system. 144
In the first of these decisions, United States v. Fordice,145 the

Supreme Court addressed the Mississippi higher education system. 146 The Mississippi State University system is composed of
eight separate campuses.147 Although the State no longer fol136. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038-39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring).
138. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
139. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 1038.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. The Equal Protection Clause
states: "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
143. United States v. Fordice, 112 S.Ct. 2727 (1992).
144. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
145. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
146. Id. at 2733.
147. Id. at 2732. Mississippi's eight public universities are: University of
Mississippi, Mississippi State University, University of Southern Mississippi,
Delta State University, Mississippi University for Women, Jackson State
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lowed the concept of "separate but equal" that was found unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education,148 the race-neutral selection system utilized by the Mississippi higher education
system produced campuses composed of 80% to 91% whites at
the University of Mississippi, Mississippi State, Southern Mississippi, Delta State, and Mississippi University for Women, and
at Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi Valley, 92% to
99 % of the student population was black. 149 Under the race-neutral selection system, admission to a particular university depended on a student's score on the American College Testing
Program (ACT). 150 Mississippi required higher ACT scores for
15
some universities, but not for others.
The Supreme Court held that Mississippi, by adopting and implementing a race-neutral selection policy, did not do enough to
disestablish segregation. 152 There were many failings on the part
of the university administrators in their application of the raceneutral selection system that perpetuated this segregation. 153 For
example, students who scored fifteen or above on the ACT were
automatically eligible to attend the more select schools, which of
course were predominantly white, while those who scored less
than fifteen were automatically sent to the schools which were
predominantly black. 15 4 This effect was directly related to the

significant difference in the test scores between white and black

University, Alcorn State University, and Mississippi Valley State University.
Id.
148. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
149. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2734.
150. Id. at 2738-39.
151. Id. at 2739. Students who received a score of 13 or 14 on the ACT
were generally excluded from those universities which were regarded as white.
Id.
152. Id. at 2736.
153. Id. at 2738.
154. Id. at 2739.
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students. 155 Indeed, a high percentage of blacks achieved low
scores on the ACT. 156
Furthermore, black universities, as compared to their white
157
counterparts, had a much more limited academic mission.
When established, black dominated schools were designed to
educate black students in teaching and agriculture. 15 8 Then, in
1981, three white-dominated colleges were designated as
"comprehensive" universities, offering a variety of programs and
graduate degrees. 15 9 Two other historically white universities and
two black universities were labeled as "regional," providing students with limited program availability. 160 Essentially, the Supreme Court held that "when combined with the differential admission practices and unnecessary program duplication, it is
likely that the mission designations interfere with student choice
1
and tend to perpetuate the segregated system." 16
The Supreme Court, however, was not as hard on the local
school system. In Freeman v. Pitts,162 DeKalb County, Georgia
had been under a federal court decree for many years to desegregate its schools. 163 There were certain phases of the operation
which were race-neutral, 164 although the school system as a
whole had not totally complied with earlier decrees. 165 The
question in Freeman was whether a federal court can withdraw its
supervision over those phases of a school board's operation that
were now in compliance with the law, but maintain control only
over those phases of the school system's operation that have not

155. id.
156. Id. In 1985, 72% of white high school seniors received a score of
fifteen or higher, whereas less than 30% of black high school seniors achieved
the same score. Id.
157. Id. at 2741.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2742.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
163. Id. at 1435.
164. Id. at 1436-37.
165. Id. at 1437.
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complied with the law.166 Such an action was called the
"incremental withdrawal of [court supervision]." 167 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that it was permissible
for federal courts to "return control to the school system in those
areas where compliance has been achieved, limiting further judicial supervision to operations that are not yet in full compliance
with the court decree."168 Indeed, this decision underscores the
Supreme Court's effort to relinquish federal control over local
activities. 169
ProfessorEileen Kaufman:
Do you think that New York v. United States, when considered
with Gregory v. Ashcroft, 170 signaled some new chapter in the
Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence?
ProfessorLeon Friednan:
In my view, New York v. United States was an easy case.
Every aspect of the law was upheld except for the title compulsion element.171 Justice O'Connor's analysis was quite important
because it introduced a whole new aspect of political responsibility, namely, that one of the elements in state and federal relationships is whether it is clear who is responsible for a particular
policy.172 That element should be taken into account as you do
the analysis. I think it is a new approach and certainly a new
factor that we never had to consider before in looking at this
problem.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 1443.
Id.
Id. at 1446.
Id. at 1445.
111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2429 (1992).
Id.at 2424.
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Audience Participant:
I just have one question from a parochial point of view, dealing
with interstate commerce and garbage. It seems that there may be
some differences in this type of commerce since garbage impacts
on so many purely local questions like land use and the need for
resources. For instance, one part of a county having enough resources may refuse out-of-state garbage while other parts of a
county needing resources may want the garbage to come in from
out-of-state. How does this factor into anything you have discussed so far?
ProfessorLeon Friedman:
The Supreme Court has stated that a policy implicating interstate commerce will be upheld if it furthers legitimate health or
safety concerns and cannot be accomplished through nondiscriminatory measures. 173 But a local government cannot simply set up
a political barrier to what is essentially an economic problem. 174
Essentially, local governments may not refuse garbage because it
was generated in another county or state unless there is a valid
17 5
health or safety reason for doing so.
Audience Participant:
What if a county's landfills are of limited size and, therefore, it
refuses to accept out-of-county garbage because it would rather
save its landfills for the disposal of its own waste?

173. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2027 (1992).
174. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
175. See id. See also Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2027.
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ProfessorLeon Friedman:
Although a county may want to save its landfills for its own
residents, it cannot do so because states, and thus counties too,
176
are not independent economic units.

176. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024. "[A] State (or one of its political
subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by
curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the
State, rather than through the State itself." Id.

